Liberal internationalism is under the microscope as never before as the world experiences turbulence and anxiety. The spectre of right-wing authoritarianism and even fascism haunts western societies as struggles for recognition dominate domestic politics, while demands of (re)emerging states for international representation grow more compelling. Simultaneously, there is broader recognition of a growing legitimacy crisis of the American hegemon principally due to the mindsets and failures of its liberal hegemonic elites. Both developments are major advances in understanding how the West dominates 'diversity regimes' or co-opts discourses universal in origin and character, and of how the US foreign establishment has brought the world to the current conjuncture. Yet, there are limitations still. Although central, the concepts of diversity, hierarchy, and elites, need to be broadened out significantly, and rooted in corporate-class power, to fully comprehend the core crises of international order today.
divisions has not come to pass. On the contrary, the world is experiencing turbulence and anxiety. Unorthodox political and ideological forces are increasingly significant across the world, and the specter of right-wing authoritarianism and even fascism haunts Western societies. Intertwined with the above, there are greater demands for recognition. The politics of identity, for example, has come to dominate domestic politics in multicultural Europe and the United States, while the demands of (re)emerging states such as China and India for international-institutional representation commensurate with their powers grow more compelling. Such concerns had motivated Samuel Huntington's controversial 'clash of civilizations' thesis at the very beginning of the post-Cold war era, which reads, in the age of Trump, as somewhat chilling. And in the post-9-11 era, Walter Russell Mead extolled the virtues of the cultural affinities and world-order-making superiorities of (racio-cultural) Anglo-Saxons. 2 The demand for diversity is preoccupying leading minds in the International Relations (IR) discipline, including but not limited to Amitav Acharya and Christian Reus-Smit, whose recent books are under consideration here. So, too, is the growing crisis of legitimacy of the American liberal hegemon and the hierarchies it generated, especially due to the mindsets, entrenchment, and failures of its dominant foreign policy elites. 3 The resultant literature has led to major advances in understanding on the one hand of how the West dominates so-called "diversity regimes" (Reus-Smit) and co-opts the IR discourse (Acharya) , and on the other hand of how the U.S. foreign policy establishment, wedded to a globalist-interventionist mindset, has contributed to bringing the world to the current conjuncture. In this essay I argue that although the concepts of diversity and hierarchy are both central to the broader scholarly discussion and to our understanding of global order, we are still missing some crucial pieces of the puzzle. In particular, I advocate for using the lens of class in order to expand on those concepts and to better capture the core crises of international order today. I will show that it is not only constructivist scholars such as Acharya and Reus-Smit who have this blind spot, but realists and liberals as well.
Beyond greater scholarly clarity, there is also a political question rooted in extant structures of power, especially in relation to the United States: Given its desire to remain dominant, steeped as it is in a history characterized by imperial and racialized mindsets, is the United States, and the broader West, able and willing to accept Global South powers on an equal footing? Even with its first African-American president there was little, if any, discernible change in U.S. foreign policy, let alone any material improvement in domestic racial equality. 4 With President Donald Trump elected on a promise to put (white) America
First, openly declaring whole national groups criminals, an entire continent unfit for humans, and a preference for Norwegians, the political space for "diversity" politics on an international scale remains very narrow.
ACHARYA: ORGANIC INTELLECTUAL FOR NON-WESTERN ELITES?
Amitav Acharya's argument and empirical study shows clearly how Western IR has frequently co-opted new ideas from non-Western scholars, yet has denied the latter full recognition. He examines ideas such as human security (Mahbub al Haq) and responsible sovereignty (Francis Deng), among others, that were first developed by non-Western scholars and then went on to become "Western" and therefore universal. There is a major idea-shift, he argues, that may well be even more consequential than the global power-shift currently underway. At any rate, the sheer combination of the two shifts has and will change the world. Conference and in the 1970s with the New International Economic Order's demands for redistributing income, power, and wealth. Today, "the Rest" are looking to contribute positively to the international order. Yet "a bit of intellectual racism" appears to have prevented the Global South's intellectual and practitioner pioneers from receiving due recognition. 5 Acharya argues that the interdependencies of the West and the Rest, of the travel and reconstitution of ideas and norms in the modern world, combined with the reemergence of non-Western powers to the international stage, necessitate greater recognition, equity, and West-Rest cooperation.
Acharya, in Gramscian terms, is playing the role of an organic intellectual 6 for reemerging states' elites, the successor generation to the postcolonial leaders who (somewhat more radically) demanded a redistribution of international power in a New International Economic Order. 7 In that regard, however, one could raise a major issue with the "nonWesternness" of some of the more important intellectuals and practitioners he discusses.
Francis Deng, for example, worked for an American think tank (Brookings), was educated in part in London and at Yale, and has taught at MIT, Johns Hopkins, and held a Distinguished
Fellowship of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Though he has certainly brought an African experience to his perspectives on world problems, especially of displaced persons, he is also a member of the cosmopolitan elite. His African experience in itself is necessary and important. But there are limits to how radical a shift such greater diversity of global elites in the halls of power might actually offer to those, the majority of the world's population, who
are not so represented.
REUS-SMIT: WHOSE CULTURAL DIVERSITY?
In an interdisciplinary study, and in the context of rising non-Western powers, xenophobia, The dynamic therefore is significant, as the powerful "take extant cultural heterogeneity and construct authorized forms of difference" (p.8). The question that is not addressed, however, flows directly from this claim: who are the power-holders who take, reshape, and authorize cultural difference? In the same section of the book, Reus-Smit notes that "hegemonic beliefs affect the nature of an order's basic institutions," though tellingly there is no reference to the origins of these "hegemonic beliefs" (p.12).
Reus-Smit's interesting new concept-"diversity regime"-injects into the IR discipline the importance of culture and cultural diversity in any full understanding of international orders. In the first volume of a planned trilogy, Reus-Smit suggests that world history and international orders are really diversity regimes. That is, in addition to reflecting Liberal internationalists, as well as constructivists such as Acharya, would be more or less optimistic on this score. Reus-Smit, I suspect (though he does not quite explicitly state his conclusion), would suggest that given that diversity regimes change over time and that Western societies value multiculturalism over assimilation, and despite the rise of white identity politics, accommodation will be difficult but doable. There is faith, at a deep level, that the liberalism of the international order and its cornerstone states will allow it to cope with changing global power and cultural distributions and diffusions, and it will move to accommodate non-Western cultures and states. But I would suggest that while such moves may empower non-Western political, cultural, and economic elites, the international order would remain far off from cultural, political, and economic equality given its elitist character.
Interestingly, Reus-Smit was inspired by Acharya's call to IR scholars, as president of the International Studies Association, to recognize and repair the narrowness of Western IR scholarship, noting that their work and ideas had excluded the majority of the world's peoples. And Reus-Smit's study, like Acharya's own, represents an important advance toward that reparation. International Relations, like the world itself, is opening up (although, it would appear, just at a time when nationalisms, walls, and barriers are ever more significant).
BROADENING THE BASIS OF OLIGARCHY?
In 1975, Tom Farer wrote in Foreign Affairs that demands by postcolonial leaders for a new international economic order could easily be sated by a few concessions to a few aspiring "middle class" Third World powers. Those leaders, he said, were no more interested in equality than Western leaders were. They simply wanted more influence for themselves and their fellow elites. Giving them a small measure of inclusion, Farrer argued, would be akin to how big industrialists handled upsurges of worker movements in the 1890s' United Statesconcessions to effectively divide and weaken. What both Acharya and Reus-Smit neglect, however, is class, and class inequalities which are re-emerging as potent ideas and political forces after spending so long in the shadow of the Soviet collapse and the liberal triumphalist celebration of the end of history, not to mention the domination of identity politics. Class and class conflict may be the deeper forces, the undertow, while xenophobic politics and identity politics more generally remain important. Sexism and racism, for example, remain major barriers to recognition, dignity, and opportunity. The identity politics movement also has a tendency to divide loyalties and class attachments, cutting across and defusing class conflicts and class-based politics. It began as a movement that argued that class is at the core of power distributions, but further stipulated that race and gender were additional double and triple burdens for workers of color or women workers and therefore should be recognized in the demands of movements for equality. It has become a series of autonomous movements that cut across and undermine solidarities rooted in class relations. 10 Nevertheless, great inequalities of income, wealth, and therefore power persist across West and non-West alike, and this fact is giving rise to a new generation of class-focused thinkers and politicians.
In the absence of class politics and conflicts, we see the limitations of the new vantage points that Acharya and Reus-Smit have opened up. As the future British Prime Minister Anthony Eden noted in 1928 in the House of Commons: "We do not have democracy, nor will we ever have it. What we have done in all progress of reform and evolution is to broaden the basis of oligarchy." 11 The worry is that after much struggle we may well achieve the kind of multiplex world order or diversity regime that Acharya and Reus-Smit desire-one in which the true contributions of West and non-West are recognized, synthesized, and celebrated; in which cultural relations and hierarchies are re-envisioned and articulated; and yet one in which serious problems of class inequality persist.
In the works under consideration here, hierarchy is principally understood as unequal relations between West and non-West, with a case made for breaking down the dichotomy through recognition of the contributions made by the non-West to "Western" ideas and norms, as Acharya demonstrates. This hierarchy can be diminished, he argues, by fully recognizing the aforementioned diversity of thought, opening the way to a "multiplex world" the popular-political terrain may be fertile for radical change movements.
In order to place class more centrally in our study of the international politics of the present, I suggest we pay more attention to the works of Antonio Gramsci and of Karl Kautsky. Specifically, I take Gramsci's concept of a "historic bloc" (effectively a coalition of cross-class interests that define the core hegemonic political, economic, and ideological concepts and regimes of a particular historical era) and internationalize it by bringing states, international public and private organizations, domestic civil society, and elite private institutions across the West-Rest dichotomy into closer connection. This is to "Gramscianise" networks. 14 The advantages of Apeldoorn and de Graaf's work, however, is that it both points out some of realism's deficiencies and offers a way to evaluate Acharya's and Reus-Smit's suggestions for moving forward.
In all of these critiques, the class question hangs unanswered over the IR scholars of U.S. power, both liberal and realist. They see that the United States has waged war after disastrous war over the past quarter century under the banner of improving the worldspreading democracy, building nations, promoting and protecting human rights, fighting terrorism. For Smith, it is pure imperial hubris, "end of history" triumphalism in need of a strong dose of the philosophy of restraint. But they cannot see the relevance of class; their theories retain deep faith in American democracy and its historic promise. As I will show, however, their critiques of the system perpetuate a narrative that relies on global affairs being determined by a largely class-based international foreign policy elite.
To realists bent on exposing the "great delusions" and the "hell of good intentions" Neither Western recognition of non-Western elites' contributions to ideas nor a diversity regime that is more accommodating of Eastern and other elite cultures nor the urging of liberal-imperial or offshore balancing and strategic restraint is going to result in sufficient change to address real-world dynamics that are producing and reproducing inequality, hierarchy, and the concentrations of wealth and political power that they enable.
There is growing social pressure, just beneath the surface of most societies and reflected in national and international politics, that threatens to break out in extreme levels of social fracturing and political violence. This is widely recognized not just by Marxists but by the World Economic Forum and other corporate groups and analysts.
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Returning to Acharya and Reus-Smit, however, it is testament to the health of the IR discipline that we are having such a breadth of debate that is more inclusive of radical ideas.
It suggests that the ideas themselves are good ones and worth debating. But it also speaks volumes about where the world stands today: anxious, volatile, and fearful for the future. The old ideas and ways are sufficient neither to make sense of our problems nor to help navigate the present and future. The world appears to be at an inflection point. As Antonio Gramsci noted a century ago, "The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear." Therefore, 
